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ABSTRACT 
 Internet of Things, has started to mark its existence from past few years. Right from its 
inception with a coke machine at Carnegie Mellon University, it has come a long way, connecting 
billions of devices to internet. This journey is well supported by the advancements in networking, 
hardware miniaturization and sensing capabilities.  
 Diverse nature of applications of Internet of Things, has cut the communication barriers 
between the varieties of fields ranging from manufacturing industry to health-care industry. Smart 
Home is one such application of Internet of Things. Connectivity of home appliances, to achieve 
automation in living, defines Smart Home. Out of welter of applications that are derived from 
Internet of Things, this thesis concentrates on Smart Home. Smart Home, in practical is expected 
to conserve lot of energy, by achieving automation of home appliances, on par with best living 
experience.  
 Existing technologies such as Z-wave, One-Net, ZigBee, Insteon, had already occupied the 
Smart Home communication. However, these technologies face the problem of identifying the 
smart devices uniquely and also exhibit security vulnerabilities. Proposed scheme exploits 
accelerometer fingerprinting to identify the smart devices uniquely. Security vulnerabilities of 
existing protocols are addressed by encrypting the data on move with CCM mode of AES 
encryption. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
INTRODUCTION 
Internet of Things [1] has started to mark its existence since few years. Today, high network 
bandwidth, cheaper and high sensing capabilities, miniaturization of hardware, made Internet of 
Things visible. Communicating with non-living things had become reality. It is observed by cisco 
systems that, in 2008, the number of devices that are connected through internet had exceeded the 
number of people living on the earth [2]. By 2012, the count reached 1.5 times the number of 
people [2]. This trend is expected to grow exponentially and by 2020, the count of the devices that 
are connected, reach 50 billion, make the ratio of people to connected devices as 1:8 [2]. It is also 
estimated that by 2020, every person in the world, will communicate with average of 3000-5000 
devices around him [3]. Under the cover of Internet of things, when all the things are virtually 
connected to each other, and are able to communicate with each other, then automation is very 
much possible. Someone, need not think of refueling car, washing clothes, driving a car, taking 
pet for walk, making coffee, adjust room temperature, switch off lights and call for emergency and 
what not? Despite advancements in Internet of Things, the problems of security and privacy are 
always present. In fact, the major problem that slows down the penetration of IoT in to current 
world is security.  
 Security is always an enemy, for any technological advancement in the industry, but is of 
great concern. Suspension of production of Google glass [4], could be a good example. As there 
is increase in the number of devices that communicate, it is expected that the data that is transmitted 
over network increases enormously. As of 2012, Google search is capable of searching the data 
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which is approximately equal to 4000 Exa-bytes (stack of books from earth to Pluto eighty times) 
[3]. Facts leaves a big challenge of secure data on move.  
 Addressing any of the issues, will root back to one major problem of identification of 
devices uniquely. We could see many techniques, to identify the devices uniquely, such as UDID 
[5], Mac address [6], Serial number [7], Device ID [8]. These techniques are either used for 
identifying proprietary devices or can be easily spoofed. We provide concrete evidences of how 
existing techniques fail to identify devices categorically. Accelerometer fingerprinting [9] had 
provided, a different and concrete way of identifying devices uniquely. We exploit this technique 
to provide a secure communication in smart home environment.  
 Smart home [10] is one of the applications of Internet of Things. Smart Home is a 
technology, where all the devices in home, communicate to each other so as to achieve automation. 
It seems orthodox, that when we wake up, the room temperature is adjusted automatically, bed 
coffee is ready for us in the coffee machine, water will be warm/cool based on the room 
temperature, your phone prepares schedule for day, switches off the electric fan and light the 
moment you left a room and what not? Smart Home thus, provides user friendly environment. 
 This thesis focusses on generating unique cryptographic keys for smart devices, which can 
also be used to identify the devices uniquely. This thesis also focusses on providing secure 
communication in smart home environment. The organization of the document is as follows. 
Chapter two will provide architecture of smart home environment. This chapter also provide 
security schemes that are feasible in smart home environment. Chapter three will provide new way 
of generating True Random Numbers called Accelerometer Fingerprinting. This technique is used 
to identify smart devices uniquely, in proposed method. Chapter four will provide information 
about the existing security protocols that are employed in smart home. This section also provide 
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certain short comes of existing protocol, which are addressed by proposed method. Chapter five 
will provide proposed security system for smart home environment. Chapter six will provide 
strong defense for proposed scheme, by providing attack-defense models. Chapter seven will 
provide comparative analysis of proposed scheme and existing schemes in smart home. Chapter 
eight concludes the thesis by providing summary. Chapter nine provides some intuitions of future 
work to make smart home secure.    
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CHAPTER 2: 
SMART HOME COMMUNICATION AND SECURE SCHEMES 
2.1 Smart Home Environment  
 Smart Home Environment is defined as home like environment that possess ambient 
intelligence and automatic control and capable of reacting to the behavior of residents and to offer 
various accommodations and is further divided in to healthcare based, multimedia based, security 
based, and energy efficient based [10]. Smart Home interconnection specifications and 
communication technologies are very new and relies more on local networks [10]. Health care 
based Smart Home, adapts Body Area Network (BAN) so as to monitor the health condition of 
people living inside the home [10]. Security based and Energy efficient based Smart Home, adapts 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN) to achieve automation, and provide better living experience for 
users [10]. Multimedia based Smart Home adapts Personal Area Network (PAN) to give user the 
best experience of electronic devices [10]. These diverse networks constitute to a concrete Home 
Area Network (HAN). Gateways based on Machine to Machine infrastructure, interacts with 
surrounding environment [10]. 
 Due to diverse technologies that are adapted by Smart Home to achieve automation, we 
need controllers to negotiate the protocols that are adapted by these technologies. Typically, this 
controllers receives the data from all the devices, analyze them, and then take the necessary 
reactive measures to achieve automation.  
 Smart Home environment in not only restricted to achieve the automation based on the 
sensing data, but also expands towards the behavioral analysis of persons living in Smart Home 
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[10]. This behavioral analysis is done in the cloud, which receives the data from the sensing 
devices, through gateways provided by Machine to Machine infrastructure in Smart Home and 
analyze the natural habitat of people living in Smart Home [10]. Based on this analysis, cloud will 
provide the certain recommendations for the user for better living experience.  
 This thesis primarily concentrates on secure communication between the sensors in smart 
home and controller that analyze the data so as to provide energy efficient and secure smart home, 
with automation. As explained earlier these technologies use Wireless Sensor Network (WSN). 
This thesis is intended to provide a secure scheme to provide integrity and confidentiality of sensor 
data. 
 Figure 1 would depict the smart home architecture. This figure shows different networks 
in smart home and their communication interfaces. Health care of user is monitored through Body 
Area Network (BAN). Surveillance, security and energy management are controlled by Wireless 
Sensor Networks (WSN). User personal entertainment can be monitored and controlled through 
Personal Area Network (PAN). All these networks are integrated by wired or wireless interfaces 
to provide automation. Figure 1 also provide some of the existing protocols that provide 
automation. M2M infrastructure in smart home acts as gateway to outside environment. Cloud 
which receives the data from all the surrounding networks would provide early recommendations 
to the user, to provide smart life. 
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Figure 1: Smart Home Architecture  
 Devices in smart home environment are constrained in memory and computational 
capacity. Smart home can adapt only light weight schemes, as devices are constrained. Section 2.2 
provides secure communication schemes and their feasibility in smart home environment. 
2.2 Secure Communication Schemes 
 This section aims to provide basic security schemes that are widely used in network of 
nodes. This section also provides the information about what scheme could be best suitable for 
Smart Home environment.  
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2.2.1 Symmetric Cryptography v/s Asymmetric Cryptography 
In the world of cryptography, we had two major schemes that ensures the confidentiality 
of data on move, namely symmetric cryptography [11] and asymmetric cryptography [11].  
Symmetric cryptography is scheme, where same key is used to encrypt and decrypt the 
data. Symmetric encryption is light weight encryption scheme. Security of symmetric 
cryptography lies in the shared secret key. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is most secure 
symmetric encryption standard till date [12].        
Asymmetric cryptography is scheme, where each communicating peers will have a public 
and private key pairs. Public keys are used to encrypt the data and private keys to decrypt data. 
For example, if node ‘A’ wishes to communicate to node B, A will encrypt the data with the public 
key of node B and can send cipher-text over insecure channel to node B. On the other end, node B 
decrypts the received cipher-text with its own private key. Public keys of all the nodes are known 
to every other node, whereas private keys are completely private to the nodes. It is claimed to 
impossible to decrypt the cipher-text, which is encrypted with public key, without private key.  
Smart devices or sensors in smart home can adapt only to symmetric encryption, due to 
their low computational capacity.  One problem that still haunts is sharing a secret key between 
the communication peers. Nevertheless, symmetric encryption is light weight solution, and is 
feasible for providing confidentiality in smart home network. 
2.2.2 Authentication of Sensors in Smart Home 
Secure communication in Smart Home includes identifying the legitimate sensors in home 
environment. An anonymous sensor node can impersonate the communication in home 
environment and can get access to private data. Secure schemes has to identify such anonymous 
nodes, to ensure secure communication. Techniques like linking control, can restrict the 
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communication to legitimate nodes, by identifying them with unique identifiers. There are many 
existing techniques to identify a device uniquely, such as, Device ID [8], MAC address [6], Serial 
Number [7], UDID [5]. Despite many techniques to identify a device uniquely, every technique 
has limitations. For instance, Device ID is the identity used for the devices with telephony 
capabilities [8]. We cannot expect to have the telephony capabilities for all the devices in Smart 
Home environment. MAC address is the physical address of a device, this address can be changed 
by the owner of device [6]. Unique identifier is expected to be same throughout the life cycle of 
device and hence MAC address could not be used as unique identifier. Serial Number can be used 
as unique identifier, but it is available only in the later versions of smart devices [7]. UDID is the 
unique identifier for devices from Apple Inc, but this UDID is deprecated in later versions of Apple 
software [5]. All the above mentioned schemes are machine generated and are Pseudo Random 
Number Generators (PRNG’s). In this thesis, we provide a different scheme to identify the devices 
uniquely, by exploiting the manufacturing errors. Manufacturing errors are not only more random, 
but also provide high uniqueness compared to PRNG’s. Analysis of Pseudo Random Number 
Generators (PRNG) v/s True Random Number Generators (TRNG) are described in following 
section.  
2.2.3 Pseudo Random Number v/s True Random Number 
 Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG’s) v/s True Random Number Generator 
(TRNG) is an interesting debate in cryptography. Quite often than not, it is the tradeoff between 
the randomness and cost of generating. PRNG’s are easier to generate, but fails to provide 
complete randomness [13]. On the other hand TRNG’s are difficult to generate, but could provide 
complete randomness.  
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 Pseudo Random Numbers are the numbers that are generated by an algorithm, which makes 
them deterministic. This enforces security algorithms to use large key bit sequences, so as to 
increase sample space of possible keys. Pseudo Random Numbers can easily be substituted with 
True Random Numbers, if TRNG’s are made cost effective and resilient to side-channel attacks.   
 True Random Numbers on the other hand are highly random and are non-deterministic. 
The randomness and non-deterministic nature of True Random Numbers motivates to substitute 
Pseudo Random Numbers. We provide light weight solution to generate True Random Numbers 
by exploiting manufacturing errors.  
 Smart home environment in addition to automation, interfaces with outside environment. 
Based on increasing trend of acceptance of smart home technology, smart devices are expected to 
communicate with large number of devices in and around home environment. This fact motivates 
to identify the devices with True Random Numbers, which promises high uniqueness and 
randomness.  
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CHAPTER 3: 
ACCELEROMETER FINGERPRINTING 
 As discussed in section 2.2.3: it is True Random Numbers that fits in the context of Smart 
Home. In this section we propose a unique way to derive True Random Number. True Random 
Number is defined by the probability of recurrence of bit sequence in a sample space is nearly 
equal to 0. Pseudo Random Number, being generated by deterministic algorithms, which follows 
a specific pattern, fails to provide complete randomness.  
 Unlike, existing schemes, proposed scheme generate keys through True Random Number 
Generators. Every device in smart home environment is expected to be identified uniquely by the 
controller node or by the cloud. With increasing number of devices that are connecting to Internet 
where randomness in keys is on demand, existing key generation techniques which rely on 
PRNG’s might lose their integrity. 
3.1 Different Ways of Generating TRNG’s 
True Random Numbers can be derived through various ways. One of the easiest way is to 
maintain a counter, where in each time you increment the counter to derive the new number, 
different from previously derived random numbers. This scheme would provide complete 
uniqueness by fails to provide randomness. In context of cryptography this provides very minimal 
security. Intruder can easily guess the next key bit sequence, as it is one more than previous key 
bit sequence.  
 The most significant way to create a True Random Number is through the manufacturing 
errors of a device. To fit the context, we could consider the manufacturing errors of the sensors. It 
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is a well-known fact that, any device is prone to manufacturing errors and these errors are 
completely random, assuming the proper functionality of manufacturing machinery. As these 
errors are completely random and are non-deterministic, they can generate True Random Numbers.   
3.2 Dependency Problem 
 Unique identifiers should be easy to generate and consistent throughout the lifetime of 
device. We need a location specific constant entity, against which we can calibrate the device to 
derive manufacturing errors. For instance, it is difficult to calibrate the manufacturing errors of 
temperature sensor, as the temperature at a specified location is not constant. One entity, which is 
constant at specific location is acceleration due to gravity ‘g’. Acceleration due to gravity on a 
device can be measured with accelerometer. Manufacturing error of accelerometer can be used to 
generate True Random Numbers.  
3.3 Accelerometer Fingerprinting 
 Accelerometer fingerprinting [9] is a technique of identifying the devices uniquely, based 
on the manufacturing errors of the sensor called accelerometer. Accelerometer is a sensor which 
measures the acceleration due to gravity [14], which is constant at specified location. Most of the 
electronic devices, today are equipped with the accelerometer circuitry, and is exploited in various 
ways. There might be few devices which might not be equipped with accelerometer circuitry, this 
problem can be solved by installing an Arduino, which can act as accelerometer. With rapid change 
in Internet of Things, we can expect minimal die area of Arduino, which provide the functionality 
of accelerometer. It will be even more efficient, if manufacturers, could go a step ahead, and 
provide the accelerometer functionality in the chip of device, as the die area of accelerometer 
would be few millimeters [15]. Every device is equipped with accelerometer, could be a strong 
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assumption, but minimal die area and promising fingerprinting through manufacturing errors of 
accelerometer, support accelerometer fingerprinting to generate TRNG’s. 
3.4 Experiment Conducted to Provide Correctness Proof of Accelerometer Fingerprinting   
 Calculating accelerometer errors in smart home devices would be extremely time taking. 
We chose smart phones to demonstrate accelerometer fingerprinting, because accelerometers 
would show manufacturing errors in any of the smart devices they are installed on. Smart phones 
are equipped with accelerometer circuitry. Despite the fact that this experiments are performed by 
[9], we choose to perform them again to measure the accuracy of the results. We developed an 
android app, which acts as an interface with the accelerometer circuitry. We took the advantage of 
the interface called SensorManager in Android, which provides the data of all the sensors that are 
in smart phone. With the help of this app, we are able to store the values of acceleration of smart 
phone in all the three coordinate axes (X, Y, and Z).  
3.4.1 Experimental Setup 
 Experimental setup for the correctness proof of accelerometer fingerprinting very simple. 
All we need to have is a plane stable surface and smart phone with accelerometer app installed on 
it. Smart phone, when placed on plane surface without any physical movement, would result in the 
acceleration only in perpendicular direction to surface of contact. This acceleration is typically 
equal to the magnitude of acceleration due to gravity at the location of experiment. We can monitor 
the acceleration of smart phone in all three directions with the help of app.  Data record from the 
data set of accelerometer readings should ideally show (0, 0, value of g) corresponding to (X, Y, 
Z) axes. Due to inherent manufacturing errors in devices, they show variation in the readings. We 
perform similar experiment with various smart phones to provide strong evidence that 
manufacturing errors would produce True Random Numbers.  
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 Figure 2 shows the experimental setup. A smart phone is placed on plane surface, without 
any physical motion. Figure also shows accelerometer app installed in smart phone. This 
experimental setup is to demonstrate accelerometer fingerprinting.  We chose to use smart phone, 
as it is easy to interface underlying sensors in smart phone. Accelerometers in any of smart devices 
would exhibit similar fingerprinting, as they exhibit in smart phones.  Hence, keys derived from 
accelerometer fingerprinting are expected to be completely random. Figure 3 which shows the 
results of fingerprinting, which certify the fact that keys derived from manufacturing errors are 
completely random.  
 
 
Figure 2: Experimental Setup 
3.4.2 Location Specific ‘g’ Value 
 Acceleration due to gravity changes from location to location [14]. In fact the acceleration 
due to gravity is the resultant acceleration of all the force of attractions that acts up on body. 
Standard gravity of earth measured at sea level is 9.8 m/s2. The value of ‘g’ can vary with elevation 
of location above sea level, tidal impact, local gravity variation and latitudinal position [14]. Out 
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of these the most significant change can be visible only when there is change in latitude. All the 
other factors might constitute to ± 0.0006 m/s2 [14]. As this value is very minimal, we ignore this 
change and calculate the manufacturing errors based on latitudinal changes. All the experiments 
of this thesis are conducted in Tampa, Florida, USA. As per the approximation provided by [14], 
the acceleration due to gravity at Tampa is measured as 9.79169 m/s2. 
3.4.3 Quantization of Accelerometer Error  
Quantization of accelerometer error is done similar to proposed method in [14]. To 
calculate the error of accelerometer, we need to calculate the offset of device. We calculate offset 
using following formula. 
     
     𝑍𝑚: 𝑂𝑍 =  𝑍𝑚 − (𝑔 ∗ 𝑆𝑧) [14]  ----------- (1)  
 
 Oz, represents the offset of error, calculated from accelerometer in Z-direction [14]. Zm 
represent the measured ‘g’ value from accelerometer. ‘g’ represents acceleration due to gravity 
corresponding to the location of experiment. Sz represents the sensitivity of accelerometer error.  
 Offset of an error corresponding to any axis requires sensitivity of accelerometer. 
Sensitivity of accelerometer can be calculated by taking the values of the accelerometer while the 
smart phone is both directions i.e facing upwards (Zm+) and facing downwards (Zm-) [14]. 
Sensitivity of accelerometer is provided by following formula 
     𝑆𝑧 = (𝑍𝑚+ −  𝑍𝑚−)/2𝑔[14]  ----------- (2)    
 From eq 1 and 2 we get  𝑂𝑧 = (𝑍𝑚+ +  𝑍𝑚−)/2 [14] 
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 We calculated the offset values of 7 different android smart phones, the results turn out to 
be promising for accelerometer fingerprinting. We plot these values so as to provide the confidence 
on accelerometer fingerprinting, which in turn results in generating True Random Numbers. Figure 
1 would depict the accelerometer fingerprinting very precisely.  
 
Figure 3: Accelerometer Fingerprinting 
 The above figure would demonstrate the accelerometer fingerprinting [9]. This graph is 
plotted between the sensitivity of the accelerometer sensor and corresponding offset in Z-direction. 
As we could see that no two accelerometers would result in same offset value, we claim that no 
two accelerometers can have same manufacturing errors. Similar experiments can be conducted 
along other coordinate axes. Similar experiment is conducted on 16000 smart phones by [9]. 
Results of this experiment clear provides randomness of manufacturing errors, and thus support 
accelerometer fingerprinting. 
 A key bit sequence can be generated from accelerometer fingerprinting by various key 
generation schemes such as quantization techniques. As these key bit sequences are generated from 
the manufacturing errors of accelerometer, they are True Random Numbers.  
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CHAPTER 4: 
EXISTING PROTOCOLS AND THEIR SHORT-COMES 
 Smart home automation completely relies on the secure communication between the 
devices and smart home controller. Smart home controller provide communication interface 
between varieties of devices in smart home. Some of the existing protocols in smart home 
environment that provide communication interface to achieve automation are Z-wave [16], ONE-
NET [17], ZigBee [18],[22], Insteon [19],[20] etc. We provide details of existing protocols, before 
proposing our scheme.  
4.1 Existing Protocols 
4.1.1 Z-Wave  
Z-wave is proprietary Smart Home automation technology, developed by Zen-sys, later 
acquired by Sigma Designs. Z-wave’s primary concerns was about control lighting, HVAC and 
security. Z-wave infrastructure includes a controller to control the communication of devices in 
the Smart Home. Each device is configured and assigned a Node ID [21]. A unique Network ID is 
assigned to controller of every Smart Home [21]. The Z-wave network can be uniquely identified 
by the Network ID, which is derived from hardware based PRNG [21]. The security between the 
devices and controller is promised by AES encryption [21]. This security is questioned against 
using the temporary hardcoded key to encrypt and decrypt key exchange packets, which leaves a 
vulnerability to the attacker [23]. Attack can be made even easier as this protocol do not provide 
the state validation during the key exchange [23].Due to its proprietary nature, this network cannot 
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be extended to the devices from other manufacturer. We propose a similar architecture in our 
secure smart home scheme, but proposed scheme can be extensible to devices from different 
manufacturers. 
4.1.2 ONE-NET  
ONE-NET [17] is an open source standard for wireless networking. This wireless standard, 
implements Tiny Encryption Algorithm to encrypt the messages between the communication 
nodes. 128-bit block cipher experienced duplicate keys and compromised security to an effective 
key length of 126-bit [24],[25],[26]. Even though, they find a fix for this vulnerability with the 
advanced version of XTEA [27], root cause behind the vulnerability is certainly usage of PRNG’s 
as keys. Our approach will assure, complete randomness of key bit sequence, by exploiting 
accelerometer fingerprinting, a TRNG.  
4.1.3 ZigBee  
ZigBee [18],[22] is IEEE 802.15.4 specification suite for high level communication 
protocol. To ensure secure communication, ZigBee uses CCM mode of encryption [22]. CCM 
mode is combination of CBC-MAC mode and Counter Mode. Devices encrypt the sensor data 
with 128- bit block encryption technique, Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). Message is 
signed by generating Message Authentication Code (MAC) with Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) 
mode of AES [22]. Message and MAC are encrypted using stream cipher in Counter (CTR) mode 
of AES [22]. ZigBee uses three different type of keys to ensure integrity and confidentiality of 
messages namely, Master Key [22], Link Key [22] and Network Key [22]. Master Keys are 
installed in the devices, to provide protection for link keys. Link keys are used to encrypt the data 
between the nodes. Network key [22] is a unique key assigned to every node in the network, to 
recognize that all the nodes in network. As the number of nodes in the network increases, the 
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memory required to store the Master Keys, Link Keys and Network Keys increases. Our proposed 
method, will mitigate this effect to centralized node inside home environment, which is expected 
to have high configuration compared to the sensor devices. This approach also provides very low 
resilience. 
4.1.4 Insteon  
Insteon [19],[20],[21] is a home automation technology, where devices communicate 
synchronously over a dual mesh network that combines the RF wireless network and the electrical 
wiring. The dual band communication is to provide the integrity of communication between the 
devices. Security to bind the sensors to communicate among the sensors, inside the home is 
controlled by linking control [20]. Insteon technology can also adapt to centralize monitoring, with 
the help of central controllers. Each and every device is identified by unique identifier similar to 
MAC address [20]. Firmware would recognize the legitimate sensors based on the unique 
identifiers assigned to the sensors [20]. Whenever a new device is added to the existing network, 
user has to perform operations in the devices so as to configure it with the network. This approach 
demands user intervention to configure the device to network. This approach is not compatible 
with the devices, which do not provide user interface. Insteon [20] do not make any encryption, as 
the whole security is promised by the linking control provided by Firmware [20]. The security of 
Insteon is thus criticized by [28].  
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CHAPTER 5: 
SECURE SMART HOME COMMUNICATION SCHEME 
 Existing secure smart home protocols had problems in either extending the compatibility 
to variety of devices or compromising the security, by week PRNG’s. In addition to that using 
PRNG’s to compute MAC of messages to provide the proof of message origin, is completely 
dependent on the randomness of PRNG’s.  
ONE-NET [17], which uses Tiny Encryption Standard, had faced problem of lack of 
randomness in the key, resulting in decrease of effective length of the key from 128-bits to 126-
bits. The secure scheme we propose uses the TRNG by exploiting accelerometer fingerprinting.  
Every device in the ZigBee [18], [22] protocol has the link keys of every link that device 
shares, gives no resilience on the attack. Compromised node in ZigBee would expose all the link 
keys to attacker.   
Z-wave [16] protocol being a proprietary protocol, would serve only the devices that are 
from Sigma Designs. This approach would lead to partial automation of smart home, as only 
automation services by Sigma Devices are only achieved.  
Insteon [19],[20],[21] protocol suffers the problem of human intervention while 
configuring a device to smart home network. Insteon in the name of linking control [20], do not 
use any encryption. This technique is criticized against security by [28].  
Proposed scheme would solve the short comes of above protocols, based on strong 
assumption, that every smart device is equipped with accelerometer. We anticipate that minimal 
20 
 
die area of accelerometer sensor, should not be a barrier for penetration of proposed scheme in to 
the Internet of Things.   
5.1 Topology  
In proposed scheme, nodes communicate over mesh network. All the nodes in the home 
network will send their packets to centralized node called controller, through intermediate nodes. 
Centralized node which is capable of analyzing the data received, receives data from all the sensors 
in the home environment and take reactive steps to achieve automation. Intermediate nodes will 
only forward the packet, until packet reaches the centralized node. For instance, if node A wishes 
to communicate with the centralized node, it encrypts its packets with the secret key of centralized 
node and transmits packet through the intermediate nodes. Intermediate nodes, simple forward the 
packet, until packet reaches centralized node. Centralized node which is in possession of keys of 
all the nodes in the network can easily decrypt the message using the corresponding key of node. 
If centralized node wishes to send the packet to any of the nodes, it will encrypt the packet with 
key of corresponding node and forwards the packet to the node through intermediate nodes. Every 
node, will check if the packet sent by controller is intended to itself; if the packet is not intended 
to the node, it just forward the packet. If the packet is intended to itself, then packet is decrypted 
with its own key.   
5.2 Secure Channel Establishment  
To ensure confidentiality of data in move, we need to establish a secure channel between 
nodes and controller. As discussed earlier, public key cryptography is not feasible in smart home 
environment, we choose symmetric encryption. We use accelerometer fingerprinting to derive 
unique keys for nodes. Keys of all these nodes are to be shared with controller node. Secret key of 
controller has to be shared with every other node. Key exchange is extensively debated in the 
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symmetric cryptography, where no technique has ever promised the secure way of sharing secret 
key. Key exchange is a vital step in whole security system and has to be done in very secure way. 
We try to solve this problem by limiting the timing window for attacker to launch an attack. Every 
node should be configured to the network, to be identified as legitimate node. Key exchange 
happens during the configuration. It is most unlikely that attacker launches the attack during the 
limited time of configuration of device. 
5.2.1 Key Generation  
With the motivation of identifying all the nodes in the Smart Home uniquely and also to 
provide the high security, we opt for TRNG’s to generate keys. Accelerometer Fingerprinting had 
provided, adequate randomness in keys and is also complex to re-generate same key. Each and 
every node in the Smart Home network is assumed to have accelerometer circuitry in their chip. 
With the help of diverse manufacturing errors that accelerometers would exhibit, we can easily 
identify the nodes uniquely. As the manufacturing errors are completely random, attacker cannot 
able to generate the same key bit sequence, in trail of mimicking the legitimate node. These 
manufacturing errors of accelerometers are hashed with an efficient hash functions to generate 
unique and secure bit sequences. Output of hash functions are used as keys for symmetric 
cryptography, to ensure confidentiality of communication. 
5.2.2 Key Exchange  
Nodes in the network generate the keys based on their accelerometer fingerprinting. To 
establish a secure channel between nodes and controller, keys has to be exchanged between all the 
nodes and controller. The key exchange has to be done through a secure channel. In proposed 
scheme, key exchange happens at the time of configuring a device to controller. Once the keys are 
exchanged, nodes in the network can communicate with the controller securely. As the 
22 
 
configuration of a node takes very minimal amount of time, we assume that attacker will have a 
very less timing window to launch an attack to retrieve keys. Controller also keeps track of node 
ID’s and the keys of nodes. Hence, this also acts as an authentication for nodes in the network. 
This prevents unauthorized node communication in network.   
5.3 Secure Communication  
We had successfully established a secure channel between all the nodes and controller. All 
the communication between the nodes and controller happens through the established secure 
channel. Keys generated through accelerometer fingerprinting are used to encrypt the messages to 
provide confidentiality. Proposed method uses AES encryption to encrypt the data between nodes 
and controller. Nodes will encrypt the data with their own key and send to controller. Controller 
would decrypt the packet with the node keys, as key of every node is known to the controller. 
Similar to ZigBee [18],[22], we provide packet integrity by calculating MAC of packet using the 
Cipher Block Chaining technique. Message is now appended with the calculated MAC and 
encrypted with Counter mode of AES encryption. Cipher text thus generated is sent to controller 
through the intermediate nodes. Controller, which in possession of key of the node, will decrypt 
the packet. Controller will also calculate the MAC of the message and then compare the MAC it 
received, to ensure the integrity of message. Proposed method fairly mimics the ZigBee protocol, 
to provide integrity and confidentiality of data, but proposed method provides high resilience. We 
provide strong defense of proposed secure scheme.  
5.4 Security of Proposed Scheme  
Common traits in which security of system is questioned are against, confidentiality of the 
data in move, authentication of communication node, integrity of messages, availability. We 
defend our proposed scheme in following sections. 
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5.4.1 Confidentiality  
Confidentiality of information plays a key role in Smart Home security. No user wishes to 
expose his way of living to the outside world. In the proposed scheme, communication between 
the nodes and the controller is encrypted using AES algorithm. For an attacker to crack the key 
used for AES encryption, he has to brute force AES algorithm by trying all 2128 possible ways of 
keys. Unlike Tiny Encryption Algorithm [24],[25],[26], the keys in proposed scheme are derived 
from manufacturing errors of accelerometers and hence provide complete randomness. Using 
TRNG’s makes our approach robust, to create the random keys, unlike any other security schemes. 
Higher the randomness, more is time taken for attacker to crack the key. On top of it, we also use 
a very secure mode of encryption coupled with AES, AES-CBC-CTR. Using secure modes of 
operation provide high confidentiality of data.  
5.4.2 Authentication  
Authentication in smart home environment is identifying the legitimate nodes. In proposed 
scheme, every node in the network has to be configured with the controller. New nodes has to be 
configured at the time of installation. Controller will save the ID’s and keys of all the nodes in the 
network during configuration. Attacker might introduce a malicious node to intercept the 
communication in the smart home, but this can be easily identified by the controller, as the key 
value of malicious node cannot be matched with the list of keys of legitimate nodes.  
5.4.3 Integrity  
Integrity plays a major role in the smart home security. Reactive steps has to be taken based 
on the strength of integrity of the data received from the nodes in the network to achieve 
automation. In proposed method, nodes calculate the Message Authentication Code (MAC) 
through AES-CBC technique and send MAC along with the message. Controller on receiving the 
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packets, calculates the Message Authentication Code on message and compare it with the received 
MAC. Malicious node which tries to change the message can be easily caught, as it cannot 
calculate the same MAC with different key.  
5.4.4 Resilience   
Resilience is an important security concern. Despite strong security mechanisms, nodes are 
susceptible for attacks. When a node is compromised by attacker, it is very important to ensure 
security with rest of the network. Unlike, Z-wave [16] and ZigBee [18],[22] protocols, the nodes 
in proposed scheme will not contain the keys of every other node. If any node is compromised in 
either Z-wave [16] or ZigBee [18],[22], as it contains keys of all other nodes in the network, all 
the keys are exposed. In proposed scheme, when a node is compromised, only key of 
corresponding node is exposed.   
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CHAPTER 6: 
ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SCHEME 
 Secure smart home scheme is derived from existing schemes. Proposed scheme do not 
contradict any of existing protocols. Existing protocols, already had proved their mark in the smart 
home industry. Proposed scheme is an integration of existing techniques, to provide better security 
in the smart home. We provide attack- defense model for the AES-CBC-CTR encryption mode, 
we adapt to achieve confidentiality of data.  
6.1 Security Against AES-CBC-CTR  
Advanced Encryption Standard is the secure standard till date in symmetric cryptography. 
AES in its original form is still possible to crack by brute-force attack. A better security can be 
achieved using it in combination of CBC mode and CTR mode. This mode is already in practice 
in ZigBee [18],[22] protocol. CBC mode is used to calculate the MAC of data, so as to provide 
integrity. Data and MAC calculated on data are then encrypted with AES using CTR mode to 
provide confidentiality. Proposed scheme on using these efficient modes on AES can defend 
against attacks like Cipher-text only attacks, Known Plaintext attacks. Analysis of proposed 
scheme is based on assumption that key is not compromised.  
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6.1.1 Cipher-Text Only Attacks   
6.1.1.1 Attack   
Attacker can eavesdrop the communication to get the cipher-text. Strong Cryptanalysis on 
these cipher-texts can provide knowledge of secret key. 
6.1.1.2 Defense 
AES-CTR mode is used to encrypt the data in proposed method. AES-CTR is a stream 
cipher. A nonce, which is a counter is encrypted with the key derived from accelerometer 
fingerprinting results in a bit sequence, which is further used to encrypt the data. Despite strong 
cryptanalysis, attacker cannot calculate the bit sequence in which the plain-text is encrypted, 
because this bit sequence is generated by encrypting a nonce with a highly random key.   
6.1.2 Known Plain-Text Attacks 
6.1.2.1 Attack 
Known Plaintext attack are very common in smart home. In smart home environment 
malicious node can sense the same parameter as legitimate node. Attacker knows the plaintext. 
Attacker can also eavesdrop the communication to retrieve cipher-text. Attacker can perform 
cryptanalysis on plain-text and cipher-text pairs to get information about key. 
6.1.2.2 Defense 
Despite having knowledge of plain-text and cipher-text, attacker cannot get the key of 
device. Attacker might get the bit sequence, with which the plaintext is encrypted, as encryption 
is XOR operation between the plaintext and derived bit sequence. Attacker cannot derive any 
information of key with the information he has. 
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6.2 Security of Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) in Smart Home Automation 
6.2.1 Replay Attack  
Replay attacks on Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) are very common. Attacker intention 
on launching replay is to discharge the battery of sensors. Replay attacks can be serious threat to 
the availability of service. Malicious node can impersonate either the controller or any sensing 
device. Controller being computationally more complex than sensing node, can withstand this 
attacks. On the other hand, impersonating controller and sending the data seamlessly would 
discharge the battery of sensing node. 
6.2.2 Defense   
Replay attacks can be easily defended by using CTR mode of AES. Key of AES in CTR 
mode is generated from a nonce, which typically is a counter. Counter in CTR mode of AES 
increments by 1 for every communication. Counter is set to random Initialization vector and is 
communicated with controller. For every communication, sensor node increments this counter and 
generate bit sequence, which is further used for encryption. Symmetrically, controller will also 
increment the value of Initialization vector and derives key bit sequence to decrypt the cipher text. 
Attacker who has cipher text instance of communication, tries to send the same packet to sensor 
nodes, impersonating the controller. However, sensor nodes can easily detect this and drops the 
packet that is sent by attacker. 
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CHAPTER 7: 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED SCHEME  
 Proposed method do not contradict or oppose any of the existing schemes. Instead, had 
integrated best practices from all the existing schemes. Our major concern is to provide a secure 
communication across different smart home devices. Smart home providers either proprietary or 
open source has provided partial automation of smart home. Proposed method by using 
accelerometer fingerprinting, can cut the barriers in policy making by smart home providers. 
Proposed method, which is derived from existing techniques, can motivate the smart home 
providers to extend their services to achieve complete automation. This section provides complete 
comparative analysis of proposed method with existing techniques. 
7.1 Accelerometer Fingerprinting v/s Pseudo Random Number  
 Despite strong Pseudo Random Number Generator algorithms to generate a bit sequence, 
to identify any device uniquely, the trust on the randomness is not so motivating. Tiny Encryption 
Algorithm [24],[25],[26] which uses Pseudo Random Number Generator for keys, had decreased 
the effective length of key from 128-bit to 126-bits [24]. To overcome this problem and to ensure 
complete randomness, proposed method rely on manufacturing errors, which are completely 
random. Despite, of fact that not all smart devices are equipped with accelerometer fingerprinting, 
we believe accelerometer fingerprinting would be off the shelf technology to identify devices 
uniquely. 
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7.2 Centralized Approach v/s Distributed Approach  
Centralized approach is defined as centralized control over communication. Centralized 
node (controller) in smart home provides communication interface between all the smart devices. 
Z-wave [16] technology is an example for centralized approach. ZigBee [18],[22] which is 
distributed approach, but can also operate through centralized approach.   
 Distributed approach is defined as decentralized control over communication. Every smart 
device will be able to communicate with every other smart device in the communication range. 
Every device is connected to internet and can send the data to client location for behavioral analysis 
of user. Client which offers this smart home service would send recommendation to user to make 
user life smart. ZigBee [18],[22] in its naive form is an example for distributed approach. 
 Both approaches have advantages and short-comes, as far as secure smart home is 
concerned. Traits to analyze above mentioned approaches are; Resilience, Connectivity, Storage 
Complexity. 
7.2.1 Resilience  
Despite, strong security mechanisms that are employed in smart home, when a smart device 
is compromised, distributed approach discussed above would reveal the keys of every other smart 
device in smart home. Whereas, in proposed scheme, with centralized approach, when a smart 
device is compromised, only key of corresponding smart device is only exposed. ZigBee [18],[22], 
despite using both the approaches, fails to provide resilience.  
7.2.2 Connectivity  
In distributed approach, as every device is in possession of keys of every other device, 
strong connectivity between the devices is expected. On flip side, in centralized approach, as every 
node has to communicate with the centralized node, will provide an illusion of low connectivity. 
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However, using mesh network topology, proposed scheme will ensure good connectivity. Despite 
the fact that all the devices can share data with centralized controller, these data packet traverse in 
the same as in distributed approach, with the help of intermediate nodes. However, intermediate 
nodes which do not possess the keys of source device, cannot decrypt the packet. Once the packet 
reaches controller, controller can decrypt the packet to retrieve data. This way we ensure complete 
resilience, by preserving connectivity.  
On careful observation, not every device in smart home communicates with every other 
device. For instance, security system which provide door lock, will never communicate with 
temperature sensors inside smart home. This fact reduces the communication complexity in smart 
home and also provides the motivation for centralized approach.    
7.2.3 Storage Overhead 
Sensors in smart home are expected to have very less storage resources. As the number of 
smart devices increases with time, storage complexity of device in distributed approach would be 
a bottleneck. In centralized approach as every device is expected to communicate only with the 
controller, this complexity is mitigated to centralized node. Centralized node being high capable 
can store the keys of all the devices in smart home. 
 
 
 
 
 
31 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 8: 
CONCLUSION 
 Smart home technologies are being revolutionized over few years. Market, started with a 
simple automated locks and is extended to provide best living experience for user by behavioral 
analysis. Existing technologies had already marked their significance in providing security to the 
smart home. However, approaches that existing technologies follow, can be improved. Proposed 
method would solve some of the issues with existing technologies. Proposed method do not 
contradict with existing techniques, instead compliment them by taking the efficient schemes they 
implement.  
On solving the problem of identifying the devices, we replace Pseudo Random Number 
Generators (PRNG) with True Random Number Generator (TRNG), the accelerometer 
fingerprinting. Unlike existing technologies, proposed method can be extended to the smart 
devices from different manufacturers. Proposed method still stick to basic mesh topology, used by 
most of the existing technologies. Proposed method implements the centralized approach for 
communication. Centralized approach provides high resilience compared to distributed approach. 
In approach of providing confidentiality, message authentication and integrity of data, we 
implement secure AES-CCM encryption scheme, similar to ZigBee. Despite, using same 
encryption technique as ZigBee, we provide better resilience and robust defense for replay attacks. 
This thesis provides complete analysis of proposed scheme. 
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CHAPTER 9: 
FUTURE WORK 
 Smart Home technology aims to provide better living experience by achieving automation, 
and also by behavioral analytics. This thesis primarily focusses on automation of devices that 
communicate over Wireless Sensor Networks. Future work on this technology can focus on unique 
security mechanism to all the different networks that are available in smart home, to achieve better 
automation. Future work can also focus on the variety of integration protocols that act on the data 
received by controller from smart devices. Controller, being in possession of all the secret 
information of smart devices in smart home is more susceptible for attacks, future work might 
focus on securing the controller node. It is also important to secure the inbound and outbound data 
traffic of smart home. Future work can focus on making strong decision taking algorithms, which 
makes the tradeoff between the data received from sensors in smart home and data received from 
the cloud, which computes behavioral analytics. Despite, random key generation mechanism in 
proposed scheme, we had not discussed the efficient way of key exchange between the smart 
devices and controller. Future work can contribute for secure key exchange mechanisms in smart 
home.  
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